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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Examining the global reinsurance market for catastrophic losses, we propose a new theory of optimal 
risk sharing that finds its inspiration in the economic theory of the firm. Our model offers a theoretical 
foundation for the vertical and horizontal tranching of insurance contracts (also known respectively as 
proportional and excess of loss reinsurance contracts). Using a two-factor production model popular in 
industrial economics, we show how reinsurance should be optimally layered (with attachment and 
detachment  points)  for  a  given  book  of  business.  This  allows  us  to  find  the  minimum  insurance 
premium  necessary  to  cover  the  cost  of  catastrophic  events.  We  conclude  with  public  policy 
implications by showing the conditions under which government intervention in the catastrophic loss 
insurance industry can reduce the cost to society of bearing risk and increase its welfare. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The insurance industry’s capacity to absorb large, catastrophic losses is a concern not only for insurance 
providers,  but  also  for  consumers,  regulators,  and  perhaps  even  more  importantly,  for  public 
policymakers (see Cummins et al., 2002) and efficient risk sharing in the economy (see Froot, 2001). 
Insurers  and  reinsurers  operate  efficiently  when  there  are  a  large  number  of  relatively  small, 
uncorrelated individual risks to insure. When these risks are correlated however, insurers and reinsurers 
have a more difficult time offering protection as the advantages of pooling diminish; a consequence of 
which  is  that  the  insurers’  cost  of  capital  can  become  so  expensive  that  insurance  is  no  longer 
economically sound (see Cummins and Trainar, 2009). Traditionally, reinsurance contracts have been 
used to share catastrophic risk within the insurance industry (see Froot and O’Connell, 2008).  Capital 
market products such as cat bonds, industry loss warranties, and sidecars have become increasingly 
popular especially in the higher layers (see Albertini and Barrieu, 2009), yet reinsurance remains as the 
main risk sharing vehicle for catastrophic risk. 
Motivation  for  this  paper  stems  from  not  only  the  magnitude  and  uncertainty  regarding  potential 
catastrophic losses, but also from the public policy discussions of the best methods of financing these 
risks.  These discussions include the role of the private insurance market, the role of reinsurers, the role 
of public financing through government entities (both state and federal level) and the role of capital 
markets.  The public policy implications of having different levels of government involved in the supply 
of insurance capital are not trivial, even if one abstracts from the moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems (see Kessler, 2008, for more details on the economic foundations of the role of the state as an 
insurer of last resort). Public intervention will have an impact on the price of insurance and on the 
wellbeing of insurers, reinsurers, and policyholders (see also Niehaus, 2002). It will also have an impact 
on  the  tax  base  as  every  individual  in  the  state  or  in  the  country  becomes  an  “investor”  of  the 
government-as-(re)insurer.  With  the  discussions  in  the  United  States  and  in  Europe  of  multi-state 
catastrophe pools or a federal catastrophe pool, the roles of insurers, reinsurers and public entities 
increasingly becomes a public policy issue.  A more exhaustive study of the optimality of attachment and 
detachment  points  can  aid  public  policymakers  in  making  decisions  in  the  best  interests  of  their 
constituents.      
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Our model will show conditions under which government intervention is warranted. We will show that if 
the government’s cost of borrowing is not sufficiently smaller than the cost of capital of the reinsurance 
market, or if the maximum possible loss is not high enough, then government intervention would be 
suboptimal and only lead to an increase in the total cost of insurance irrespective of the expected loss.  
The remainder of the paper is as follows. We present a literature review of reinsurance and catastrophic 
insurance in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to presenting the crux of our industrial organization model 
of catastrophic risk sharing in the insurance market. In Section 4 we examine the role (or absence 
thereof) of government in this market and how the wrong type of intervention can lead to a reduction 
of society’s welfare. We conclude with Section 5. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. The Market for Catastrophes 
Worldwide,  the  costs  and  damage  associated  with  catastrophic  events  continues  to  increase 
(Kunreuther and Michel-Kerjan, 2009).  These events can be natural (earthquake, flood, windstorm, etc.) 
or man-made (terrorism, oil spill).  The one source of damage garnering the most interest from the 
insurance industry is windstorm since flood and earth movement are excluded from most property 
policies in the US.  Since 1990, more than 45% of total catastrophe losses in the US are due to hurricanes 
and  tropical  storms  (www.iii.org,  last  accessed  11/03/10).  The  population  growth  and  property 
development in coastal areas prone to hurricanes and tropical storms have greatly increased the value 
of property exposed to loss.  In the US alone, hurricane-prone states have more than $4 trillion dollars in 
aggregate coastal exposure (www.air-worldwide.com, last accessed 11/12/15).  Significant uncertainty 
regarding the magnitude of future losses exists.  This uncertainty is driven by a lack of understanding of 
frequency and severity of storms and the potential impacts of global warming trends (Kunreuther and 
Michel-Kerjan, 2009).   
Financing of catastrophic risk is increasingly becoming a public policy issue at the state and federal level 
(see Lewis and Murdock, 1996, Cummins et al., 1999, and Kessler, 2008, amongst others). The growth of 
government provided or sponsored insurance in hazard prone areas (see Cole et al., 2010, and Hartwig      
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and Wilkerson, 2007, 2010) increases the importance of finding the proper role and price for private 
market insurance.  Our paper seeks to answer the following four fundamental questions regarding the 
market  for  catastrophe  insurance.  1-  What  do  insurers  bring  to  the  table  if  it  is  not  capital  and 
underwriting expertise? 2- Where are the optimal attachment and detachment points for reinsurance? 
3- When should reinsurance be layered and when should it be proportional? 4- Should government 
entities be involved in catastrophic risk financing and if so, at what point(s) in the loss distribution? 
The cost (ex the expected loss that has to be borne by society no matter what) of catastrophic insurance 
can be so high that making an implicit government’s guarantee (such as disaster relief) explicit can 
reduce cost so that the policyholders’ (and thus society’s) welfare increases. Our model will not suggest 
that governments should intervene in all insurance markets, quite the contrary. Our thesis is that IF 
governments have a cost of capital that is lower than that of reinsurers, then it is POSSIBLE to design an 
optimal level of government intervention in the insurance market that would increase society’s welfare. 
The government’s ability to underwrite risk (i.e., identify who has a low probability of loss and who has a 
high  probability  of  loss)  is  poor,  so  that  the  presence  of  government  sponsored  entities  in  lower 
tranches of risk bearing capacity reduces society’s welfare. Therefore this intervention would only occur 
at such high levels that the government becomes a reinsurer of last resort. This is already the case if one 
considers that governments already provide protection against large macro risks through an appropriate 
funding of the criminal, penal and judiciary systems, and national defense.  
2.2. The Capital and Labor Cost of Reinsurance  
As the insuring entity becomes more and more removed from the risk that is insured, information 
becomes more and more costly to obtain. Fazzari et al. (1988) show the cost of capital depends on the 
amount of asymmetry between providers and users of capital.  Information asymmetry is also used in 
Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000) when they study the case of the cost of reinsurance. They argue 
that information problems drive most of the risk-allocation between insurers and reinsurers. As a result, 
long-term relationships become optimal because they allow the inclusion of new information in the 
pricing of reinsurance coverage. These long-term relationships do not need to be codified exactly in a 
long-term contract, but can result from the renewal of short-term contracts that incorporate, at each      
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renewal date, new information that is available about the insurable risk (distribution of frequency and 
severity), market conditions, changes in insurer operations, etc.  
The fact that insurers have an informational advantage over their investors, that is much larger than that 
of reinsurers over theirs, provides a strong foundation for the primary insurers’ having a higher marginal 
cost of capital than the reinsurers. The reason why the information asymmetry is larger for insurers than 
reinsurers  comes  from  the  optimal  contract  structure  that  we  observe  when  there  is  information 
asymmetry. As we know, when information asymmetry exists between a policyholder and an insurer, 
irrespective of whether it is in the form of moral hazard or adverse selection, it is best to have a contract 
that does not completely insure the policyholder. As a result, coinsurance and deductibles are a rational 
response to information asymmetries. With reinsurance contracts, this partial insurance is even less 
subject  to  asymmetric  information  problems  since  the  reinsurer  not  only  is  generally  assuming  a 
portfolio of risk whereby individual idiosyncratic risk has been almost completely eliminated, but also 
assuming a higher tranche means that information asymmetry problems are reduced. Investors know 
this as well, so they should request a lower informational risk premium from reinsurance companies 
than from primary insurers.   
In  our  framework,  relatively  small  (i.e.  non-catastrophic)  losses  require  significant  investment  in 
underwriting and claims adjusting expertise, but as the size of the loss grows (i.e., it approaches that of a 
catastrophe), underwriting and claims expertise becomes less important and having access to capital 
becomes more important.  Consequently, we can presume that individual risks do not matter as much 
for  reinsurers;  as  you  get  to  higher  attachment  points,  capital  becomes  more  important  than 
underwriting expertise at the individual risk level.
 1 Since reinsurance contracts are often sold in layers 
(see Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003, Hurlimann 2003, and Ladoucette and Teugels, 2006), one can 
imagine that primary and working layers are more labor intensive than the higher layers that are more 
capital intensive.  
Zanjani (2002) argues that capital costs are an important component of reinsurance contract pricing. 
Since reinsurers are exposed to  significant capital outflows when a catastrophe occurs, the cost of 
                                                            
1 See Berger et al. (1995) for an early contribution on the general role of capital for financial institutions.      
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providing financial security increases by more than the expected liability amount. In other words, the 
marginal price of insurance is an increasing function of the marginal liability.  
In contrast to Mayers and Smith (1990) that mostly view reinsurance as a corporate risk management 
tool, other insurance economists (see for instance Powell and Sommer, 2007, Berger et al., 1992, and 
Garven  and  Lamm-Tennant,  2003)  have  essentially  seen  the  purchase  of  reinsurance  as  a  capital 
structure decision, with equity capital and reinsurance acting as substitutes.
2  Paradoxically, in a world 
where insurers and their providers of capital have access to capital markets, reinsurance, as a method of 
reducing  the  riskiness  of returns  to the owners of  the  insurer,  becomes  redundant.
3 
  Given  that  a 
suboptimal capital structure (Myers and Majluf 1984) leads to undertaking value-destroying investments 
or foregoing value-enhancing projects, having a suboptimal amount of reinsurance  should lead to a 
decrease  in  the operating  efficiency  of  insurance  entities  and  higher  premiums  for  the consumers.  
Consequently, not only is reinsurance an important component of insurer efficiency, it can also be an 
important lever of public intervention.  
2.3. The Role of Governments 
In addition to primary insurers and reinsurers, entities that could potentially assume some catastrophic 
risk are the different levels of government. Because of their taxing authority, governments have the 
highest ability to access the capital markets and the lowest cost of bearing risk. But because of their 
                                                            
2  Traditionally,  the  corporate  finance  literature  has  sought  to  explain  how  corporations  choose  their  capital 
structure  as  an  optimal  mix  between  debt  and  equity.  Applying  the  same  approach  to  insurers,  insurance 
economists have had to adjust the financial economic model of capital structure to include a type of capital that 
manufacturing firms do not have: Reinsurance capital. This contrasts with the approach used in Doherty and Tinic 
(1981) where reinsurance is examined as a bilateral risk-reducing agreement between risk-averse insurers. 
3 The argument is similar to that of Modigliani and Miller (1957) whereby the insurers’ shareholders can reduce the 
impact  of  idiosyncratic  risk  by  diversifying  their  personal  portfolios.  If,  however,  risk-averse  policyholders  are 
incompletely diversified because of transaction costs or some other reason, they are willing to pay a premium that 
is inversely related to insurer’s probability of default. Put differently, risk-averse policyholders are willing to pay a 
higher price for an insurance contract that originates from an insurer whose probability of default is low (Sommer, 
1996).      
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structure, we can assume that governments have the worst underwriting ability because they are not in 
the business of selling insurance (see Lewis and Murdock, 1996).
4 A similar argument can be made about 
insurance-linked securities (see Albertini and Barrieu, 2009, and Cummins and Weiss, 2009). General 
capital market investors who include insurance-linked securities in their portfolio of financial assets 
probably know less than primary insurers about the risks they are implicitly underwriting, but they have 
access to significantly more capital than insurers, and at a cheaper price too. Many insurance-linked 
securities  are  designed  exactly  so  that  general  market  participants  do  not  need  much  expertise  in 
underwriting  real  risk  events.  For  instance,  parametric,  modeled,  or  dual  triggers  reduce  the 
underwriting risk in the security’s payout structure and replace it with basis risk for the entity that 
issued the insurance-linked security.   
As public policymakers are increasingly aware of the impact of insurance availability and affordability on 
their  constituents,  government  intervention  in  insurance  markets  has  increased.  Both  the  federal 
government  and  various  state  governments  function  as  primary  insurers  (National  Flood  Insurance 
Program, various state beach and windstorm pools) and reinsurers (Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, 
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund).  In addition to the insurance programs, the federal government 
has stepped in to provide disaster relief to areas hit the hardest by natural catastrophes.  Assuming such 
interventions can be welfare enhancing (see Niehaus, 2002, for general conditions under which this 
would be so), they must be designed to be as efficient as possible. The model we develop in this paper 
addresses  exactly  the  situation  of  a  public  policymaker  who  seeks  to  structure  the 
insurance/reinsurance market to minimize the total cost of insuring a catastrophic loss.  
   
                                                            
4 Political pressures may also affect a government entity providing insurance.  Underwriting and claims adjusting 
services  provided  by  private  market  insurers  are  usually  based  on  actuarially  sound  principles.    Government 
entities may be influenced by externalities in providing these services.  Evidence of this type of political influence 
can be seen in the National Flood Insurance Program (see Browne and Hoyt, 2000) and Citizens Property Insurance 
Corporation and the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (see Cole et al., 2009). The population’s expectation of 




The service provided by insurance companies can be divided into two distinct components: A  labor 
intensive component and a capital intensive component.  The underwriting and claims adjusting services 
that insurers provide is mostly labor intensive whereas their ability to pool individual risks, diversify risk 
by  line  of  business  and  geographically,  and  attract  and  supply  financial  resources  to  support  the 
products they sell is of course capital intensive.   
Although insurers and reinsurers share common characteristics (e.g. access to the same capital markets, 
substantial  financial  distress  costs,  etc.),  the  distinctions  between  these  two  services  are especially 
relevant to the provision of catastrophe insurance.  The cost of capital and the ability to underwrite and 
adjust claims at the individual risk level are critical factors in determining where in the loss distribution 
(primary layer, working layer, excess layers, etc.) a financial service entity would be most efficient in 
providing coverage.   
3.1. Evidence of Capital and Labor Costs  
Reinsurers often have better diversification opportunities than primary insurers if only because they do 
not face the same regulatory oversight as primary insurers. Furthermore, they are generally larger global 
entities (see Table 1) than primary insurers, thus allowing them to gain access to a much wider set of 
potential sources of risk whose losses are presumably less correlated, thus increasing their potential for 
diversifying their losses. We show in Table 1 that U.S. reinsurers have substantially more surplus per 
company (more than 300% larger than the next largest segment) than any other segment U.S. insurers.  
Reinsurers domiciled in the United States hold more than 16% of the total industry’s surplus, which 
makes the U.S. reinsurance industry as a whole the third largest holder of surplus in the U.S. insurance 
industry  behind  commercial  casualty  insurers  (32%  of  total  surplus)  and  personal  automobile  and 
homeowner insurers (20% of total surplus).
5 Because of the sheer size of each reinsurer, we should 
                                                            
5 The importance of reinsurers’ surplus would have been much larger had we taken an earlier year since 2008 was 
a bad year for reinsurers.      
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expect the reinsurance industry’s bankruptcy costs to be lower in expectation than a primary insurer 
operating in the same layer; this means that the reinsurance industry’s marginal cost of capital should 
be lower. Looking at the three largest lines based on surplus (these three lines account for close to 70% 
of the total consolidated surplus) we expect reinsurers to have the lowest cost, followed by personal 
insurers and commercial casualty insurers.
 6 
Table 1. Number of companies and average surplus by company for property and casualty selected segments, 2008 





















197,827  1,155,440  318,485  189,351  49,138  278,077  55,091  103,956  362,184  75,714  70,110 
% of Cons. 
Surplus 
100%  16.29%  19.77%  4.54%  0.67%  32.30%  0.10%  0.72%  1.37%  2.15%  0.93% 
Line contributions do not add to 100% because of omitted insurance lines, such as Workers’ Compensation.  
Source: Bests' Aggregates and Averages. 
Using the capital-to-premium ratio as our measure of the cost of capital,
7 Table 2 provides evidence
 that 
reinsurers have had the lowest cost of capital on average over the ten years under study, which is 
contrary  to  Zanjani  (2002).  The  capital-to-premium  ratio  does  not  take  into  account  the 
insurers’/reinsurers’ expenses. Accounting for underwriting expenses (that are much larger for primary 
insurers than reinsurers), the capital-to-premium-net-of-expense ratio is larger for primary insurers than 
for reinsurers.  This implies that the reinsurers’ cost of assuming additional risk is lower than the cost to 
primary insurers. Also, due to the reinsurer's ability to diversify, more capital is freed up on the insurer’s 
                                                            
6 It is important to remember that primary insurers and reinsurers are not offering services in the same layers; 
there is nothing in the capital-to-premium ratio that accounts for what would have been the cost of capital of the 
primary  insurers  had  they  insured  large,  infrequent  (i.e.,  catastrophe)  events,  or  what  would  have  been  the 
reinsurers’ cost of capital had it been forced to insure the first dollar. 
7 Zanjani (2002) uses the adjusted capital-to-premium ratio, where net income and surplus are discounted based 
on the segment’s payout tail.  Panel A of Table 2 is most similar to Zanjani’s calculation, less the discounting.  The 
only difference between panels A and B in Tables 2 and 3 is that Panel A is the average of ratios whereas Panel B is 
the ratios of the averages.      
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side than is bound on the reinsurer's side. Therefore, the cost of assuming the risk is lower for the 
reinsurer than for the insurer. 
Table 2. Capital-to-premium (or capital cost) ratios of selected property and casualty insurance segments 
Panel A. Capital cost ratios by year (1999-2008) and average of capital cost ratios 
Fiscal year 
end 













2008  -7.0%  -13.7%  -3.9%  -1.0%  -1.0%  1.3%  26.1%  -4.9%  -373.1%  14.4%  26.3% 
2007  12.2%  21.1%  8.6%  17.5%  7.0%  14.1%  14.6%  16.1%  -40.0%  23.9%  22.8% 
2006  17.2%  35.7%  13.1%  17.9%  7.6%  24.3%  5.8%  14.9%  106.8%  20.0%  18.3% 
2005  10.6%  4.0%  9.0%  18.5%  5.3%  7.6%  37.9%  14.0%  89.8%  9.6%  17.9% 
2004  9.8%  11.0%  10.0%  12.5%  5.0%  6.9%  12.5%  10.6%  78.2%  -1.3%  15.4% 
2003  9.6%  20.3%  7.6%  15.4%  8.4%  4.7%  9.4%  16.1%  72.0%  -4.3%  10.6% 
2002  -5.0%  -12.1%  -6.5%  4.6%  7.9%  -4.9%  6.3%  10.7%  66.9%  -25.5%  1.9% 
2001  -10.1%  -30.1%  -11.1%  -9.7%  9.4%  -9.1%  4.2%  4.0%  77.5%  -17.9%  3.0% 
2000  -2.6%  -5.4%  -6.3%  -0.5%  11.0%  0.3%  1.1%  5.5%  92.6%  -7.4%  4.0% 
1999  2.5%  -9.8%  2.8%  -9.7%  3.1%  2.7%  -7.3%  6.3%  103.4%  1.0%  9.6% 
10-year 
average 
3.7%  2.1%  2.3%  6.6%  6.4%  4.8%  11.1%  9.3%  27.4%  1.3%  13.0% 
The Capital Cost Ratio is calculated as (Net Income + Unrealized Capital Gains + Income Taxes  – Investment Income) / (Direct Premium Written + 
Policyholder Dividends – Investment Income); Investment Income is calculated as Return on Investment * Surplus.  
Source: Bests' Aggregates and Averages. 
 
Panel B. Capital cost ratio averages (1999-2008) 
Year  Consolidated  Reinsurance 
PP auto 







A&H   Credit 







4.0%  1.0%  2.6%  9.3%  5.4%  5.6%  5.4%  8.3%  64.3%  3.1%  16.1% 
The Average Capital Cost Ratio is calculated as (10 year Total Net Income + 10 year Total Unrealized Capital Gains + 10 year Total Income Taxes – 10 
year Total Investment Income) / (10 year Total Direct Premium Written + 10 year Total Policyholder Dividends – 10 year Total Investment Income); 
Investment Income is calculated as Return on Investment * Surplus. 
Source: Bests' Aggregates and Averages. 
 
When expenses are taken into account in Table 3, reinsurers still have on average a lower capital cost. 
Clearly, including expenses in the capital-to-premium ratio calculations increases the capital costs for all 
segments, but less so for reinsurance than for other segments, as we anticipated. The reason is that      
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reinsurance firm rely more on their ability to assume capital risk than their ability to underwrite to find a 
niche in the insurance industry. Consequently, reinsurers are less subject to underwriting expenses.  
Leveraging this advantage in marginal cost
8 by providing insurance policies directly to policyholders 
would reduce insurance costs if reinsurers were well informed about the quality of the risks being 
assumed. 
Table 3. Capital-to-premium-net-of-expenses ratio of selected P&C insurance segment 
Panel A. Capital-to-premium-net-of-expenses ratio by year (1999-2008), average of ratios, and impact of netting loss 
adjustment expenses (LAE) and underwriting expenses compared to capital-to-premium ratio (table 2, panel A). 













2008  -10.8%  -17.6%  -6.8%  -1.2%  -1.3%  2.1%  34.2%  -6.8%  -532.9%  22.9%  40.9% 
2007  19.4%  30.4%  13.9%  24.0%  9.6%  22.1%  17.6%  25.3%  -51.4%  41.6%  34.3% 
2006  27.4%  51.1%  21.4%  24.8%  10.1%  37.7%  23.0%  22.8%  162.5%  35.8%  27.5% 
2005  9.2%  -9.9%  9.4%  21.7%  4.0%  7.0%  22.8%  15.5%  110.2%  12.9%  22.9% 
2004  15.3%  15.0%  16.1%  18.6%  6.6%  10.6%  14.1%  16.9%  99.5%  -2.2%  21.6% 
2003  15.0%  27.6%  12.0%  22.7%  11.1%  7.1%  10.7%  23.9%  84.6%  -7.9%  16.8% 
2002  -7.6%  -15.8%  -10.1%  5.5%  11.2%  -7.4%  7.3%  16.1%  79.3%  -45.8%  3.3% 
2001  -16.1%  -42.2%  -17.9%  -12.4%  13.7%  -13.8%  5.0%  6.3%  94.4%  -34.1%  7.3% 
2000  -4.4%  -8.2%  -10.7%  -0.6%  16.5%  0.4%  1.3%  8.6%  142.7%  -17.4%  9.7% 
1999  4.3%  -16.0%  5.0%  -13.2%  4.8%  4.4%  -9.0%  10.2%  144.9%  2.4%  25.8% 
10-year 
average 
5.2%  1.5%  3.2%  9.0%  8.6%  7.0%  12.7%  13.9%  33.4%  0.8%  21.0% 
Expenses' 
impact 
+1.8%  +0.5%  +1.2%  +2.8%  +2.5%  +2.6%  +3.4%  +4.9%  +6.2%  -0.2%  +8.3% 
The Capital-to-Premium-Net-of-Expense Ratio is calculated as (Net Income + Unrealized Capital Gains + Income Taxes – Investment Income) / (Direct 
Premium  Written  +  Policyholder  Dividends  –  LAE  –  Underwriting  Expenses  –  Investment  Income);  Investment  Income  is  calculated  as  Return  on 
Investment * Surplus. The Expenses’ impact is calculated at the 10 year average in Table 3 Panel A minus the 10 year average in Table 2 Panel A.  
Source: Bests' Aggregates and Averages. 
Reinsurers do not, however, have the same knowledge and ability in underwriting and claims adjusting 
services  that  primary  insurers  have.    Additionally,  reinsurers  do  not  have  the  claims  handling 
infrastructure that primary insurers have.  The investment that primary insurers made in underwriting, 
claims adjusting and claims handling services allows them to offer these services more efficiently (i.e., at 
a lower marginal cost) than reinsurers.  The result is that reinsurers have an underwriting ability at the 
individual risk level that is less developed and less sophisticated than that of the primary insurers.  
                                                            
8 See Bauer and Zanjani (2011) and the references therein for another use of the marginal cost of capital approach 
in the insurance industry.      
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Assuming transaction costs are low, the use of a reinsurance contract with a proper attachment point 
should combine the primary insurers’ efficiency in underwriting and claims adjusting services with the 
reinsurers’ comparative advantage at obtaining capital at low cost for very large exposures.   
Panel B. Capital-to-premium-net-of-expenses ratio averages (1999-2008) and impact of netting loss adjustment expenses 
(LAE) and underwriting expenses compared to capital-to-premium ratio (table 2, panel B). 
Year  Consolidated  Reinsurance 
PP auto 







A&H   Credit 







6.2%  1.4%  4.3%  12.5%  7.5%  8.7%  6.5%  12.6%  82.8%  5.6%  25.4% 
Expenses' 
impact 
+2.2%  +0.4%  +1.7%  +3.2%  +2.1%  +3.1%  +1.0%  +4.3%  +18.5%  +2.5%  +9.3% 
The Capital-to-Premium-Net of Expenses Ratio is calculated as (10 year Total Net Income + 10 year Total Unrealized Capital Gains + 10 year Total Income 
Taxes – 10 year Total Investment Income) / (10 year Total Direct Premium Written + 10 year Total Policyholder Dividends – 10 year LAE Expenses – 10 
year Underwriting Expenses – 10 year Total Investment Income); Investment Income is calculated as Return on Investment * Surplus. The Expenses’ 
impact is calculated at the 10 year average in Table 3 Panel B minus the 10 year average in Table 2 Panel B.  
Source: Bests' Aggregates and Averages. 
 
3.2. Modeling Strategy 
Let us first posit that the total premium of the insurance contract includes the expected loss and any 
other  expenses  related  to  marketing,  underwriting,  claims  handling,  and  whatever  risk  premium  is 
needed to reward the providers of capital in this market. Let us also posit that the cost of the insurance 
contract is made up of all costs in excess of the expected loss.  Put differently, the premium is given by 
  Y C Y E    ] [  where E[Y] is the expected loss and C(Y) is the total cost of the insurance services. It 
will become obvious later why we separate this cost of insurance services (that will include underwriting 
and claims services as well as the implicit and explicit cost of capital requirements) from the  pure 
premium (or the expected economic loss), which we will assume is exogenously determined and must 
be borne by someone in the economy. The loss Y is distributed according to some density function g(Y) 
over the range  ] ˆ , 0 [ Y Y  , where Y ˆ  is the maximum possible loss. We can therefore write the expected 
loss as    
Y
dY Y Yg Y E
ˆ
0
] [ .       
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We will assume in our model that all policyholders (consumers with property exposed to catastrophic 
risk) are trying to minimize the total cost of their insurance contract. We will assume that the total cost 
of  insurance  services,  C(Y),  has  two  components:    insurer  expenses  (the  underwriting  and  claims 
administrative costs, including loss adjustment expenses) and the cost of bearing the risk. It is the 
relationship between these two cost components (the underwriting cost and the cost of bearing the 
risk) that determines the insurance/reinsurance contract structure.   
The model assumes there are N potential entities that could sell insurance protection in a competitive 
market, where the price of insurance is equal to its marginal cost (see Zanjani, 2002, and Froot and 
O’Connell, 2008).  For simplicity, assume that each of these entities is characterized by a linear marginal 
cost
9 of providing  coverage in the event of a catastrophic loss.  The marginal cost function  we use 
depends on the insurer’s cost of capital (which we shall denote k) and its underwriting and claims-
handling ability (which we shall denote b). For any of these entities, n, the marginal cost associated with 
a  possible  loss  of  magnitude  Y  is  a  linear  function  with  two  parameters,  given  by  Equation  1  and 
illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
  Y k b Y C n n n  
|   (1) 
with  ] ˆ , 0 [ Y Y   where Y ˆ  is the maximum possible loss. Entities in the economy differ with respect to 
their  n b ’s and  n k ’s as determined by the entity’s production function (discussed later).  
The intercept of the marginal cost function is equal to the cost of underwriting since the price of labor 
should not vary with the size of the risk, in contrast to the cost of capital that increases with the size of 
the risk. The policyholder’s goal is to find the policy that minimizes the total cost of insuring against a 
possible loss Y ˆ . In other words, the policyholder chooses an insurance contract, or a set of insurance 
                                                            
9 Froot and O’Connell (2008) also use a linear marginal cost of providing hedging (i.e., reinsurance) services as an 
intermediary good (see Dionne et al. 2010 for an alternative model of hedging as an intermediary good).  The 
marginal cost does not need to be a linear function of the maximum possible loss; the results will hold as long as 
the marginal cost remains an increasing function of the maximum possible loss.      
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contracts, that minimizes the integral of the marginal cost function.
10  The total cost of bearing some 
maximum possible loss Y ˆ  is the area under the marginal cost function plus a constant term, which we 
can represent as the fixed cost of organizing an insurance system that insures individuals in society 
(rent, overhead, etc).   
Figure 3.1: Linear Marginal Cost Function 
 
3.2.1 Single Insurance Provider 
If there is only one type of entity in the economy that can sell insurance (with  b bn   and  k kn  ) and 
assuming a first-dollar insurance contract (that is, the first dollar of loss is assumed by the insurer), 
society’s problem is then simply to minimize Equation 2.
11 





  (2) 
                                                            
10 The approach we use can be seen as a simplified version of the pricing model developed by Zanjani (2002).  
11 Each policyholder minimizing their individual cost is equivalent to society minimizing the overall cost.       
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The premium charged by the single provider would then be  
          Y d kY b Y Yg Y d kY b dY Y Yg Y C Y E
Y Y Y







] [   (3) 
In the case of a more general marginal cost function, say a convex function given by      Y f b Y C  
| , 
with    0
|  Y f and   0
||  Y f , the total premium would be equal to        Y d Y f b Y Yg
Y




3.2.2 Two Insurance Providers 
Now suppose there are two entities n1 and n2 such that  2 1 b b   and  2 1 k k  . This means that entity n1’s 
marginal cost intercept is lower than entity n2’s. Put differently, entity n1 is able to provide underwriting 
and claims service marginally cheaper than entity n2.  However, each dollar of coverage (marginal cost of 
capital)  is  more  expensive  for  entity  n1.  The  question  becomes  how  to  combine  the  two  entities’ 
technology to minimize the total cost of the risk. Because one entity has a lower intercept but a higher 
slope,  a  policyholder  will  minimize  the  total  cost  by  dealing  with  the  low-intercept  entity  (better 
underwriting  and  claims  service)  for  lower  losses  and  the  low-slope  entity  (lower  marginal  cost  of 
capital) for higher losses.  
Graphically, we find that the total cost of bearing risk of potential loss Y ˆ  is a combination of the two 
entities: The low-intercept entity is responsible for losses up until point y1 and the low-slope entity is 
responsible after point y1. Changing vocabulary
12 to fit with the insurance industry’s we can say that 
entity n1 is the primary insurer whereas entity n2 is the reinsurer that assumes losses greater than y1. 
The  question  becomes:  At  what  attachment  point should  the  reinsurer  become  liable  (i.e, what  y1 
minimizes the total cost of bearing this risk)? Abstracting from the expected loss component of the total 
                                                            
12 We change the vocabulary only to lighten the reading of the paper. We acknowledge that there are many types 
of financial products that can replicate reinsurance. Albertini and Barrieu (2009) and Cummins and Weiss (2009) 
provide examples of insurance-linked securities and financial instruments that can adequately replace, in some 
instances, an excess-of-loss or a proportional reinsurance contract.       
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premium, which we assume to be exogenously given, social welfare is maximized by minimizing the total 
cost  of  providing  insurance  to  policyholders.  The  minimization  problem  for  society  then  becomes 
Equation 3, and is shown graphically in Figure 3.2. 












    (4) 
Figure 3.2: Two insurance providers 
 
The total premium that policyholders would pay in the case of one primary insurer responsible for the 
losses  up  to 
*
1 y ,  which  has  been  chosen  optimally  to  minimize  the  total  cost  (i.e., 















min arg ), and of one reinsurer responsible for the losses between 














] [ .  The  premium      
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greater than 
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1 y  reinsured instead of having all the risk being borne by the primary insurer is given by  
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the property owner chooses to retain the first portion of the risk (a deductible) and then insure above 
that point, the function to minimize would then simply be equation 6, 








0 0     (6) 
In Equation 6, we let d represent the deductible and replaces y1 when comparing to equation 4. We can 
therefore see this case as that of a policyholder who becomes the first-dollar insurer who then reinsures 
the risk with what we have called the primary insurer. The total premium paid by the policyholder would 










where the attachment point  1 y  is replaced by the deductible d. The implicit total premium paid by the 
policyholder is not only that paid to the insurer, but also includes the portion that the policyholder 
retains.  Consequently,  the  total  premium-cum-cost  for  society  does  not  change  and  remains 











,  where  the  index  0  represents  the  policyholder’s 
marginal cost function of bearing risk.  
It is interesting to note that we have a new reason why deductible exists in a competitive environment. 
Even with no adverse selection or moral hazard problems, because insurers have lower capital cost of      
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bearing risk than individuals (who are better equipped to assess their own risk), individuals will assume 
the first few dollars of loss whereas insurers will step in as the providers of resources when losses are 
greater than the threshold d found in equation 6.
13  
3.2.3 N Insurance Providers 
Now suppose there are N entities such that  N b b b    ... 2 1  and  N k k k    ... 2 1 . This means that 
entity n1’s marginal cost intercept is lower than entity n2’s, which is lower than n3’s, etc. Similarly, each 
dollar of coverage (marginal cost of capital) is more expensive for entity n1 than for n2 than for n3 etc. As 
before, the optimal combination of the N entities’ technology will be for the policyholder to deal with 
the entity that has the lowest intercept first (it has the best underwriting and claims service technology), 
and then reinsure at different layers when having a low marginal cost of capital becomes important. 
Layers are determined by the comparative advantage of each reinsurer at assuming catastrophic losses 
as shown in Figure 3.3. 
Reinsurance in this economy “concavifies” the overall marginal cost function. By increasing the number 
of entities  (i.e. reinsurers) one increases the concavity of the marginal cost function and therefore 
reduces  total  cost.    The  resulting  curve  in  figure  3.3  could  be  thought  of  as  a  contract  efficiency 
(efficient-C  curve)  curve.    This  curve  could  be  used  to  compare  actual  insurance  programs  to  this 
minimum cost curve.  The insurance contracts would lie up and to the left of this curve and a measure of 
the efficiency loss would be the difference in the areas under the two curves.  It would be possible to 
determine  at  which  points  in  the  loss  distribution  inefficiencies  are  created  and  whether  those 
inefficiencies are due to capital (k) or labor (b) issues, or inefficient attachment points.     
                                                            
13 This still assumes some information asymmetry, but no residual asymmetry after underwriting expertise.  If 
there was no costly information, underwriting would not be  costly, but claims handling would still be costly, 
including some level of inefficiency. For very small losses, individuals can use their own capital (checking account, 
line of credit or credit card) to handle small claims better than insurers.      
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Figure 3.3: N insurance entities 
 
As the market allows more and more insurers that have different underwriting expertise (b) and risk-
bearing capacities (k) the total cost to policyholders, still excluding the pure premium, is decreased. This 
necessarily  improves  everyone’s  welfare.  If  there  are  N  private  insurers  and  reinsurers  such  that 
N b b b    ... 2 1  and  N k k k    ... 2 1 , society’s cost minimization problem is equation 7.  




























    (7) 
There are two types of equilibriums that can be evaluated from this model. The first is an exogenous 
equilibrium  where  the  b’s  and  k’s  for  insurers  are  determined  exogenously.  The  second  is  an 
endogenous equilibrium where the b’s and k’s are determined through a production function.   
3.3 An Exogenous Equilibrium 
Clearly the equilibrium on this market will depend on how the parameter values  i b  and  i k  of all private 
insurers and reinsurers are distributed in the economy. Suppose there are two insurers, insurer h with      
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h b  and  h k , and insurer j with  j b  and  j k . If  j h b b   and  j h k k  , then cost minimization will be 
obtained by having only one insurer. In other words, insurer h here dominates insurer j for every type of 
loss: It has better underwriting expertise and a lower cost of bearing risk. In an efficient market, insurer j 
would find itself filing for bankruptcy. 
Suppose now that  j h b b  and  j h k k   so that both insurers have the same risk bearing technology, but 
one insurer (insurer h) has a better underwriting expertise than the other. In other words, one insurer 
can  do  the  same  underwriting  job,  but  at  a  lower  cost.  Again,  insurer  j  would  find  itself  filing  for 
bankruptcy since it has a more costly production function that insurer h. A similar story can be told if 
j h b b  and  j h k k  , so that both insurers have the same underwriting ability, but one insurer (insurer 
h) has a better ability to assume large losses that the other insurer in the sense that insurer h’s cost of 
assuming the risk is lower. Clearly insurer j would find itself filing for bankruptcy, again, since it has a 
more costly production function that insurer h. 
For  an  excess-of-loss  reinsurance  market  to  exist  in  equilibrium,  it  therefore  has  to  be  that  the 
reinsurers’ marginal cost functions have a higher intercept and a lower slope. If this is not the case, then 
the entire potential loss of a policyholder will be assumed by a single unique insurer. In reality, we know 
that primary insurers rely on reinsurers to guarantee eventual indemnity payments for the highest levels 
of potential losses. Consequently, in the absence of market imperfections a policyholder’s loss will be 
handled by more than one entity only if reinsurers have a lower cost of bearing large risks than primary 
insurers.  
Assume now that the two insurers have the same b and the same k. If two insurers have the same 
marginal cost function, this means that there is no value in excess of loss reinsurance since there is no 
efficiency gain. The primary insurance market would then, on average, be split between the two insurers 
who are both offering the insurance service at the lowest possible marginal cost to the policyholders. 
Imagine that there is a third entity in this market that has a lower b and a higher k than these two. If that 
is the case, then the new entity would become the primary insurer (having the lowest intercept) and the 
two others would become reinsurers that each receives half of the primary insurer’s business. One can      
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imagine  that  this  fits  the  description,  from  the  point  of  view  or  the  reinsurer,  of  a  proportional 
reinsurance contract with each reinsurer assuming 50% of the lost above the attachment point (which is 
sometimes referred to as corridor contracts). If instead of having a lower intercept the third entity has a 
lower marginal cost slope (and a higher intercept) than the first two insurers, then the primary market 
would be split equally between the two initial insurers and both would reinsure their higher losses with 
the new entity using an excess of loss contract.  
By adding more insurance entities that have different b’s and k’s generates a market equilibrium where 
primary insurers are those that have the lowest b’s and reinsurer involvement through excess-of-loss 
contracts depends on the right combination of b’s and k’s, with the reinsurer with the lowest k and the 
highest b assuming the highest tranche. If two or more entities have the same b and the same k, then 
they split equally the tranche in which they belong in the marginal cost hierarchy (see the appendix for 
the illustration using an insurance program chart).   
If there are market imperfections, such as search, transactions and intermediary costs,
14 then it is quite 
possible that the optimal structure that minimizes total cost is not obtained. It nonetheless remains 
theoretically feasible to find the combination of insurers and reinsurers that minimizes the total cost of 
supporting catastrophic risk. Whether this optimal combination is observed in reality or not becomes an 
empirical question that can be answered in a companion paper. Consequently, insurers that want to 
insure a given tranche must balance the higher cost of capital of assuming a large tranche with the 
benefit of having lower volatility (see Tasche, 2004, Zanjani, 2010, and Bauer and Zanjani, 2011, for a 
similar idea in the case of risk capital). 
   
                                                            
14 To be fair, there have been numerous explanations for the limited sharing of catastrophe risk that involve some 
type of market imperfection such as: 1-adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the reinsurance market as 
in Niehaus and Mann (1992); 2- corporate taxes as in Jaffe and Russell (1997), Harrington and Niehaus (2003) and 
Zanjani (2002); 3- tail risk and in Bernard and Tian (2009); and 4- barriers to capital Froot and O'Connell (1999) and 
Froot (2001).       
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3.4 An Endogenous Equilibrium 
3.4.1 An Insurance/Reinsurance Production Function 
How firms decide to offer insurance service as a primary insurer or as a reinsurer, and as what type of 
reinsurer (high attachment point or low attachment point insurer) remains an open question. In the 
previous section we just assumed that some entities had high b’s and low k’s (the reinsurers typically) 
whereas others had low b’s and high k’s (the primary insurers typically) determined exogenously. 
Suppose that the genesis of the insurance market is populated by a set of entities that all have access to 
the  same  technology  that  is  given  by  some  function   
n nL K L K Tn
   
1 ,   for    N n ,..., 1  .  For 
simplicity let us assume a constant elasticity of substitution production function. All entities want to 
maximize their value by choosing the right amount of capital Kn and labor Ln,.
15 Entities differ only with 
respect to the parameter    1 , 0  n  .  Assume that all entities start with the same level of surplus, S 
(which we could also see as their available capacity – see Zanjani, 2010, for more in the marginal use 
and cost of capital in an insurance company). The price of capital is given by pK, which we will assume 
constant for a given level of capital, and the price of labor is given by pL, which will always be constant 
per unit of labor. Consequently, an entity n will choose a level of labor and capital that at most uses the 
entire insurer’s available surplus so that  S L p K p n L n k  
* * . As entities are endowed with technology 
that allows them to be more or less efficient in the use of labor or capital (the parameter   varies from 
one entity to the next), they will opt to invest more in one and less in the other. A firm’s problem can 
then be written as a choice between investment in capital and investment in labor that maximizes firm 
value: 




 . . , max
1
,
  .   (8) 
                                                            
15 As it will become apparent later, we should view labor as the investment an insurer makes in the underwriting 
and the claims handling abilities of its employees whereas capital should be viewed as its investment in optimizing 
its capital structure, ability to pool individual risks, diversify risk by line of business and geographically, and attract 
capital to meet the current level of risk it seeks to assume.      
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The solution to this problem is straightforward.
 16 Firm value is maximized when the amount invested in 


















We see that as the parameter  n   becomes larger, an entity will invest more in capital. At the other end 
of the spectrum, a low parameter  n   means that the entity has a better underwriting technology and 
therefore will invest more in the labor component.  
An alternative modeling approach would be to see S as the amount of economic capital needed to 
support a given risk. In a CAPM world, we know that for a given risk, the amount of economic capital 
needed is independent of the insurer since it depends only on the covariance of the risk with the market 
portfolio. The same is true in a reinsurance context as shown in Borch (1962). This alternative approach 
allows for the modeling of each risk individually so that (re)insurance entities are allowed to assume 
different layers for different risks. To see why, we could let the parameter    1 , 0 ,  m n   be different for 
each risk m that requires surplus  m S  to underwrite. Since the choice of capital and labor is made for 
each  risk  individually  as  a  function  of  the  surplus  that  is  required  and  the  (re)insurer’s  production 
function, (re)insurers could make different capital and labor choices as a function of the type of risk.  












17 in the marginal cost equation we had before, we see that an entity 
that is endowed with a higher  n   parameter will have a marginal cost function that has higher intercept 
                                                            
16 The first order conditions write  0
1 1  
 
k n n n p L K
n n  
   and   0 1   

L n n n p L K
n n  
  . Solving we find a 





























  . This yields an optimal choice of capital 

























1 . Solving for Kn and Ln completes the exercise.      
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and a lower slope, the type of cost function that one should observe in a reinsurer. The opposite also fits 
our model as firms whose parameter  n   is small will be more likely to become primary insurers since 
their marginal cost function will have a lower intercept and a higher slope.  
An interesting aspect of this insurance production function is that we can see that a sudden increase in 
the unit price of capital (pk) will reduce the amount of capital that every entity uses, but it will not affect 
the amount of labor used. This means that as we  transpose the production function into the cost 
function that society wants to minimize, a capital shock does not alter the intercept of the marginal cost 
function, but it does increase its slope, consistent with an increase in the capital cost of bearing large 
risks. This impact will be larger for companies that already invest a lot in the capital component of the 















. As we know 
from an earlier discussion, entities that have a large  n   parameter are those that invest more in capital, 
and that are more likely to be reinsurers. It then follows that large  n   entities (i.e., the reinsurers) will 
be more affected by capital price shocks than primary insurers, which is consistent with industry stylized 
facts as well as the literature on reinsurance capital (see Berger et al., 1992).  
Following our particular setup,  we can write that    Y Cn
|  is a function of  labor and capital so that 
















| . The comparative static shows that an increase in the price of 
labor increases the intercept whereas an increase in the price of capital increases the slope. Interestingly 
as well, an increase in the “capital intensity” parameter (αn) gives us a higher intercept and a lower 
slope. Finally, larger firms, as measured by their surplus, should have a lower intercept and a lower 
slope, suggesting that larger firms are better both at the underwriting end of the business and at the risk 
bearing end if they were to allocate their entire capital surplus to a single risk or line.  In other words, 
there is an economy of scale.  But as large insurers operate in more than one line of business (however 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 This assumes that investing more in labor (capital) lowers the marginal cost of providing labor (capital) to the 
policyholders.        
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we define a line of business, by type of risk or even geographically) what is allocated to a given line will 
not represent 100% of the larger insurer’s surplus capital. Smaller insurers could probably allocate close 
100% of their surplus capital to a single line or even risk. Consequently, even though larger insurers 
could  be  more  efficient  in  each  line  of  business,  one  must  wonder  in  what  line  –  following  David 
Ricardo’s terminology – larger insurers have a comparative advantage over other insurers.  
The advantage of the production function we have used is that it turns a two-parameter (bn and kn) firm-
specific marginal cost problem into a one-parameter firm-specific problem (αn) without altering the 
desired properties of the distribution of the marginal cost functions. In other words, if we were to rank 
the firms according to the parameter αn so that  N       ... 2 1 , we would have that  N b b b    ... 2 1  
and  N k k k    ... 2 1 . This means that the greater the “capital intensity” parameter (αn), the higher is 
the intercept and the lower the slope.  Consequently, firms that have a higher ability to use capital (i.e., 
firms that have a higher αn), should become reinsurers.  
A second important advantage of the production function we have chosen is that surplus is additive over 
the different lines of business. In other words, assuming there are M lines, firm n’s total surplus is given 
by   
m
m n n S S , . Allowing firms to have parameters αn,m that differs across lines, the total amount spent 
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) where we assumed that labor costs (resp. capital costs) are line specific. 
Size would then matter somewhat less.
 18 
                                                            
18 This is in the spirit of economic capital allocation whereby one would like to allocate capital to lines of business 
according to their marginal impact.      
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3.4.3 Some Comparative Statics 
An increase in the price of capital that reduces investment in capital will translate into a higher slope of 
the marginal cost function. The impact will be larger for firms that have a small slope since it is for them 
that the shock will feel worse.  
Figure 3.5: An increase in the primary insurer’s and the reinsurer’s cost of capital increases retention 
 
The impact of an increase in the price of capital that increases the slope of the marginal cost function of 
all insurers will not only result in a higher cost of insurance (irrespective of the expected loss), but also in 
a higher attachment point. Figure 3.5 illustrates the case where both the primary insurer’s as well as the 
reinsurer’s marginal cost slope increase. The region in red represents the extra cost to policyholders.  
It is important to remember that the increase in the cost has nothing to do with an increase in the size 
of the loss or a different loss distribution. The increase here is only associated with an increase in the 
price of capital and therefore only affects the cost of providing insurance independent of the pure 
premium or the expected loss.        
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If the market was to experience a higher cost of labor, the intercept would increase but the slope would 
not change. The increase would be larger for the primary insurer than for the reinsurer since the primary 
insurer’s  production  function  is  more  labor  intensive.  An  increase  in  the  unit  cost  of  labor  would 
increase the total cost of insurance. The attachment point would be reduced as we see in Figure 3.6.  
Figure 3.6: An increase in the primary insurer’s and the reinsurer’s underwriting cost reduces 
retention 
 
A lower attachment point means essentially that the use of reinsurance capital becomes relatively more 
affordable so that the primary insurer chooses to free more resources in order to meet its higher labor 
costs of underwriting. Combining variations in the cost of capital with variations in the cost of labor, our 
theory suggest that demand for reinsurance capital can be subject to fluctuations that have nothing to 
do  with  the  expected  loss.  Rather,  fluctuations  in  the  cost  of  labor  and/or  capital  can  increase  or 
decrease the amount of capital that is required in the reinsurance market.       
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4. AN APPLICATION TO PUBLIC INTERVENTION 
4.1 The Role of Government as an Insurance Provider 
In this model, government entities can enter as insurance entities.  We are assuming that a government 
entity has the lowest cost of raising capital through its ability to tax (so it has the lowest marginal cost of 
bearing risk, kg) but it has the highest underwriting cost since it has no expertise in the matter (so it has 
the highest intercept, bg).  Because the state has the lowest marginal cost of bearing risk, it is natural 
that it would enter the insurance market as the reinsurer of last resort (see Kessler, 2008, for other 
reasons).  Expanding  the  two-provider  model  with  the  third  entity  being  a  government  insurance 
provider, we learn that the problem for society is to find the reinsurer’s appropriate attachment point y1 
and  detachment  point  y2  such  that  we  still  minimize  the  total  cost  as  shown  in  equation  9  and 
graphically in Figure 4.1.  

















.   (9) 
If reinsurance is not allowed, but government is still there as a reinsurer of last resort, the total cost 
would be higher by an amount that is represented in the graph by the yellow triangle. The government’s 
marginal contribution to the reduction in total cost can also be measured as the lined area in red on the 
graph. Without the government as a reinsurer of last resort, private reinsurers would have to assume 
the risk from attachment point y1 until the maximum possible loss  Y ˆ . Thus, the total cost to insuring the 
loss would be greater by an amount that is represented by the lined red triangle.       
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Figure 4.1: Government Entity as Insurer 
 
If there are N private insurers and reinsurers such that b1<b2<…<bN and k1>k2>…>kN, and a government, 
whose parameters are  bg  and kg such that bN<bg and kN>kg, that acts as a reinsurer of last resort, 
society’s cost minimization problem becomes equation 10.  
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Government intervention is not considered free in our model. The premium governments should charge 
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. The benefit to society is then 
given by an equation similar to equation 5:  
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More concisely, the benefit to efficient government intervention is             
Y
Y
G N G N G
N
dY Y k k b b
ˆ
. 
4.2 Public Policy Implications when Agents Have Heterogenous Cost Functions 
The question in terms of public policy will be to assess the parameter values bi and ki of all private 
insurers and reinsurers, as well as the government’s, so that the government’s optimal attachment point 
can be determined.  With this type of model, where competition in the primary layer and working layers 
of reinsurance are dominated by firms with better underwriting and claims adjusting capabilities, there 
are no advantages to having a government entity provide insurance coverage.  It is also possible that 
there is no point for government to become involved in the insurance market as a reinsurance of last 
resort if, for instance, we find that cost minimization is obtained in the private market because the 
solution would demand that  Y yN ˆ  .  However, as the maximum possible loss increases, it becomes 
more likely that a government entity is needed in the market as its lower cost of capital begins to 
outweigh its inability to underwrite and manage claims.   
The question of government intervention cannot be studied independently of the distribution of risk in 
the economy. In the model so far, all individuals face the same risk, which means that government 
intervention  has  no  ex-ante  redistribution  impact.  As  a  result,  provided  that  at  some  level  the 
government’s cost of capital is lower than the reinsurers’ lowest, government intervention increases 
welfare.  Suppose  now  that  agents  in  the  economy  are  heterogeneous  with  respect  to  the  cost  of 
providing them with insurance. Put differently, suppose that there is a proportion     of agents (with 
1  

  ) whose total cost of insurance services  is given by    Y C
 . All agents still face the same 
expected loss, but some are more costly to insure.  
Using  the  case  of  one  primary  insurer,  one  reinsurer  and  government  (who  cost  of  capital  is 
independent of the private market’s cost function), the problem to minimize becomes      
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     , 
where the superscript represent the agents’ “cost type”, and the subscript g refers to the situation 
facing the government. The optimal contract that minimizes the total cost of insurance will differ from 
one agent type to the next as the attachment and detachment points will not be the same for every 
contract, which is represented in the minimization function by the superscript on the attachment and 
detachment points.
 19 If the government was able to offer different protection (different attachment 
points) to different agent-types, the allocation of total cost in the economy would be Pareto optimal as 
each agent would end up paying a total cost that is specific to him (as shown in Figure 4.2).  
Figure 4.2: Gain from government intervention 
 
In reality governments rarely treat different agents differently. Instead, governments often use a one-
size-fits-all approach in its policies (which may reflect its inability to underwrite or discriminate properly 
                                                            
19 The assumption here is of  course that agents differ only with respect to their cost of insurance, not their 
expected loss, although having different expected losses would not alter the main message of the model.      
31 
 
across types). Since most government sponsored property casualty insurance programs involve some 
subsidization of high risk exposures, there are also redistributive questions that need to be addressed. 
In Florida (see Nyce and Maroney, 2011), inland homeowners subsidize homeowners who live on the 
coast, and even properties slightly inland in the coastal area are subsidizing properties that are directly 
on the ocean. Although we concentrate in this paper only on the total cost associated with insuring the 
risks and not on the expected loss, we realize that premium subsidies include both the cost of insurance 
(as we defined it in the current paper) as well as the expected loss. We will examine the case of agent 
loss  heterogeneity  (with  respect  to  the  maximum  possible  loss,  not  their  expected  loss)  in  a  later 
section.  
There are two types of government involvement that would induce redistribution problems. In the first 
intervention, we will assume that government intervenes at the same level of loss for all agent types 
(that is, the government’s attachment point is the same for all). In the second, we will assume that 
government charges the same marginal cost to all the agents. In other words, the government sets 
parameters  bg  and  kg  to  be  the  same  for  all  agents,  and  are  therefore  independent  of   .  The 
redistribution aspect of insurance contracts is highlighted in Kessler (2008) who writes that the “… very 
rapid growth in the risk (government) covers … does not appear linked exclusively to the nature of the 
risks … it results especially from the behavioral adaptation to what is considered … less and less as a risk 
coverage and more and more as a right” (p. 6). 
4.2.1 Same Government Protection (i.e., Same Attachment Point) 
In the model, the government’s inability to discriminate results in every agent facing a government 
attachment point of  g y ˆ  determined exogenously. Each agent-type’s problem can then be written as 
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   (11)      
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As we see, government intervention fixes the upper attachment point  g y ˆ  so that it is no longer a choice 
variable in the problem. If government fixes its attachment point  g y ˆ  between the optimal attachment 
points of each type of agent, it is then easy to show that every agent ends up paying more for insurance 
services. To see why, observe Figure 4.3 where we highlight the gains and losses (in terms of total costs) 
to each type of agent arising from government intervention as a reinsurer of last resort. 
Figure 4.3: Gain and loss from government intervention 
 
The red wedges represent the extra cost imposed on each agent by having a fixed attachment point and 
the yellow trapezes represent the gain to each agent for having government intervention. As we see, the 
government’s attachment point  g y ˆ  lies between the two type specific (and optimal) attachment points 
2
g y  and 
1
g y . This means that, compared to the optimal type-specific entry point, government intervenes 
too early for the agents that have the lowest marginal cost (agent-type  1   ) and too late for the agents 
that have the higher marginal cost function (agent-type  2   ). As a result, both types of agents end up 
with a suboptimal situation. The loss of welfare for society is then given by the sum of the two areas 
highlighted in red.       
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Interestingly, no government intervention that fixes its entry point (i.e., fix yg to be the same for all 
agents) can be Pareto optimal.  To see why, suppose that 
2 ˆ g g y y  . The situation would then look like 
that of Figure 4.4.  
Figure 4.4: Government Intervention by fixing its attachment point below 
2
g y  
 
As we can see, neither agent benefits from the government stepping in too early in the catastrophe risk 
market. We therefore see that whatever attachment point the government fixes, heterogenous agents 
can never be better off if the entry point is the same for all and if agents differ with respect to their 
marginal  cost  function.  The  type  of  intervention  we  just  examined  presumes  that  the  government 
intervenes so that all agents receive the same “insurance” from the government entity after the loss has 
occurred. Another possibility, and the one we examine next, is that government forces all agents to 
share the cost of insurance equally so that the same underwriting cost is paid by all insured agents. 
4.2.2 Same Marginal Cost of Government Insurance 
The second type of redistribution the government can do is to forgo its ability to charge agents as a 
function of their marginal cost type. Instead the government may use an “average” cost for all. Given      
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the way we have modeled the problem here, this means that the government inability to discriminate 
results in every agent facing a government average “underwriting expertise cost” of   


  g g b b ˆ . The 
problem for each agent-type then becomes the following, and is illustrated in Figure 4.5 
























      (12) 
Figure 4.5: Government Intervention by assigning the same underwriting cost to all 
 
By using the same intercept for all agents, the government’s attachment point for the high cost agents 
(agent-type 2) decreases, but is increases for the low cost agents (agent-type 1). By doing so the high-
cost agents are benefiting from the intervention, to the detriment of the low cost agent. Each high-cost 
agent’s decrease in total cost is given by the area in yellow. Each low-cost agent’s increase in total cost is 
given by the area in red.
 20  The question, from society’s point of view, is whether the area in yellow (the 
gain) is greater than the area in red (the loss), with each area weighted, of course, by the proportion of 
                                                            
20 Note that we do not let the government’s ability to raise money be a function of the agent-type (we therefore 
assume that the government’s financing, risk bearing and taxing abilities are independent of risk type).       
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each type of agents in society,    . Surely, total welfare cannot increase given that the government 
underwriting ability is a weighted function of its ability when faced with each agent separately.  
We can combine the two types of intervention (same attachment point, same marginal cost function) 
and examine how that affects the agents’ choice of insurance contracts. The problem then becomes 























     where  g b ˆ  is defined as before as   


  g g b b ˆ . 
Our presumption is that there will be a loss of welfare for society as a whole in the event that all risk 
types share the same pooled fixed cost of underwriting because the state or the federal government 
does not obey vertical equity precepts. In other words, not treating different risk types different leads to 
a welfare loss. To see why, note that the gain for the high marginal cost agents (i.e.,  2   ) is given by 
the difference in the area under the curves from point 
' 2
g y   until the maximum possible loss Y ˆ . In our 
case, with one insurer, one reinsure and one government, the gain is given by 




















ˆ   (13) 
In the case of the low marginal cost agent (i.e.,  1   ), his loss is given by the difference in the area 
under the curves from point 
1
g y   until the maximum possible loss Y ˆ . With one insurer, one reinsure and 
one government, the loss is given by 






















ˆ    (14) 
Given the measure  1   of agents that lose and measure  1 2 1      of agents that gain, the question 
then becomes whether  Gain 1 1    is greater or smaller than  Loss 1  . We can rewrite Gain and Loss as  










' 2 2 2 ' 2 2 2
2 ˆ ˆ ˆ    (13A)      
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1 1 ' 1 1 ' 1 1
2 ˆ ˆ ˆ     (14A) 
We want to know the sign of   Loss Gain 1 1 1     . Said differently, we want to know if the gain to the 
ones outweighs the loss to the others. Note that for    1 , 0 1  ,   0 1 1 1    Loss Gain   , so that where 
there is no one that gains (receives better treatment) or no one that loses, then the welfare gains and 
losses are non existent. We want to know what happens for intermediate values of  1  . Note that the 
function    Loss Gain 1 1 1      is quadratic in  1  .
21 We will then concentrate on the second  order 
condition to see if the function    Loss Gain 1 1 1      has a maximum or a minimum. We can easily 
show that     
         0 ˆ ˆ 2





     

  
Y y Y y b b
Loss Gain
g g g g

   since 
2 1
g g b b   by assumption, 
and  Y yg ˆ ' 2   and  Y yg ˆ ' 1   by assumption. This means that we have a minimum at    1 , 0
*
1   . This means 
that as anticipated, there is no possible welfare gain in the government treating all risks the same way in 
this economy, even if the costs of underwriting is divided across all agent types.  
4.3 Public Policy Implications when Agents Have Heterogenous Maximum Possible Losses  
Risks and agents do not need to differ only with respect to their cost functions. They can also differ with 
respect to their maximum possible loss. Imagine two types of catastrophic risks, one with maximum 
possible loss  1 ˆ Y  and the other with maximum possible loss  1 2 ˆ ˆ Y Y  . Suppose that these agents still face 
the same expected loss so that one can see loss type  2    as being a mean preserving spread of loss 
type  1    (both loss types have the same expected loss, but loss type  2   is distributed over a larger 
domain). Figure 4.6 illustrates the situation. 
                                                            
21 Another approach would have been to note that    Loss Gain 1 1 1      is continuous in  1  , and show that 











Loss Gain . This would then entail that the function   Loss Gain 1 1 1      is always 
negative for    1 , 0 1  .      
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Figure 4.6: Government Intervention when risks have different maximum possible losses 
 
What would that entail in terms of government intervention? For the type of risk where the maximum 
possible  loss  is  smaller,  government  may  not  have  a  role  at  all  since  the  private  market  may  be 
sufficiently efficient to offer the insurance product at the lowest possible cost. For the risk that has the 
higher maximum possible loss, the government sponsored insurance entity is more likely to have a role 
to play in limiting the cost of insurance to society (note again that the expected loss is independent of 
government intervention).  
This raises the interesting puzzle that if two risks (or agents or entities) have the same expected loss and 
the same linear marginal cost function of identifying and bearing risk, government intervention would 
be warranted in the case of the risk that has the highest possible loss, but not in the case of the risk that 
has the lowest. Another way to present it would be to say that agents who face, for whatever reason, a 
more volatile loss distribution (their loss is a mean preserving spread of the other agents’) should be 
more likely to be helped by the government as a reinsurer of last resort than agents that face a less 
volatile distribution of losses.  




Financing of catastrophic risk is increasingly becoming a public policy issue at the state and federal level. 
The  growth  of  government  sponsored  insurance  programs  in  hazard  prone  areas  increases  the 
importance of finding the proper role and price for private market insurance.  This paper addressed the 
following four questions regarding the market for catastrophe insurance:  
1-  What do insurers bring to the table if it is not capital and underwriting expertise?  
2-  Where are the optimal attachment and detachment points for reinsurance?  
3-  When should reinsurance be layered and when should it be proportional?  
4-  Should the different levels of government be involved in catastrophic risk financing and if so, 
how and at what level? 
This  paper  presented  an  original  theoretical  model  of  the  minimum  cost  of  providing  catastrophic 
insurance  coverage  through  the  primary  and  the  reinsurance  market  that  includes  an  implicit  (or 
explicit) presence of governments as reinsurers of last resort. Using labor  (underwriting and claims 
adjusting  costs)  and  capital  (risk  financing)  as  the main  inputs for  providing  insurance  services,  we 
showed how reinsurance is optimally layered (with attachment and detachment points) for a given book 
of business. Our simple theory also explains why in some markets reinsurance is layered (and how many 
layers would be efficient) and why in some other markets reinsurance is proportional and mutualized 
(and the efficient number of risk bearing institution in the proportional layers). As reinsurance was 
always seen as a way to spread risk across a larger number of economic agents that have a greater 
ability to assume it, the risk bearing approach had little to say about the optimal layering of contracts 
and  the  vertical  and  horizontal  tranching  of  contracts.  In  that  sense,  our  paper  is  the  first  to  our 
knowledge  to  offer  a  theoretical  foundation  for  the  vertical  and  horizontal  tranching  of  insurance 
contracts that is anchored in the economic theory of the firm.  
Even though attachment and detachment points are determined to minimize the cost of insurance 
protection, the cost of catastrophic insurance can nevertheless be extraordinarily high so that making 
the implicit government’s guarantee explicit can reduce this cost and increases the policyholders’ (and      
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thus  society’s)  welfare.  We  are  not,  of  course,  suggesting  that  government  should  necessarily  be 
intervening in all insurance markets, quite the contrary. Our thesis is that IF government intervention in 
the insurance market is to increase society’s welfare, it would be at the highest possible levels of risk.  
Our thesis rests upon the assumption that governments have the lowest cost of capital of any financial 
institution or entity in a country. But if we believe at the same time that the government’s ability to 
underwrite risk (i.e., identify who has a low probability of loss and who has a high probability of loss) is 
poor, then the presence of government sponsored entities in lower tranches of risk bearing capacity 
reduces society’s welfare.  
The public policy implications of the impact of having different levels of government involved in the 
supply of insurance capital are not trivial, even if one abstracts from problems of moral hazard and 
adverse selection. Public intervention will have an impact on the price of insurance and on the wellbeing 
of insurers, reinsurers, and policyholders. It will also have an impact on the tax base as every individual 
in  the  state  or  in  the  country  becomes  an  “investor”  of  the  government-as-(re)insurer.  With  the 
discussions  of  multi-state  catastrophe  pools  or  a  federal  catastrophe  pool,  the  roles  of  insurers, 
reinsurers and public entities increasingly becomes a public policy issue.  A more exhaustive study of the 
optimality of attachment and detachment points can aid public policymakers in making decisions in the 
best interests of their constituents.      
40 
 








As the number of companies 
with “non-dominated” pairs of 
b and k increase, the number 
of layers will increase. 
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proportional sharing of losses 
in that layer. 
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